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case. The greatest difficulty presented by the cases, however, is in justi-
fying the subjective distinctions to the citizens of the United States.
Why is physical assault any more violative of "due process of law," or
antithetical to a concept of ordered liberty, or shocking to the conscience,
or offensive of canons of decency and fairness, or restrictive of funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice, or offensive to human dignity,
or brutal, than surreptitiously breaking and entering a private home,
installing a microphone in a bedroom, boring a hole through the roof,
connecting the microphone with a receiver, and listening to private con-
versations for approximately thirty days? That question the Supreme
Court has not answered.
In place of "writs of assistance," or general search warrants, today
we frequently have no warrants at all. Certainly the liberty of every
man is not "in the hands of every petty officer," but it could be said
that the liberty of Irvine was in the hands of the California police. True,
Irvine was a criminal. But he was also a citizen of the United States.
At his trial, "due process of law" could not command exclusion of in-
criminating evidence obtained by an unscrupulous intrusion of his
privacy.
It seems that distant echoes of the words of James Otis can still be
heard.
J. THaoMAS MANN
Constitutional Law-Special Privileges and Emoluments-
Race Track Franchise
In State v. Felton' the accused consented to become the test de-
fendant, was arrested on August 29, 1953, and tried on a bill of infor-
mation alleging that he "did unlawfully and wilfully place wagers and
bets on a game of chance, to-wit: dog races conducted by the Carolina-
Virginia Racing Association, Inc."2 Judge Hubbard allowed defendant's
motion to quash the bill of information for that by reason of the Curri-
tuck Act of 1949,3 the bill failed to charge the commission of any crime.
In so doing, the judge held the Act constitutional. That Act provided
for a County Racing Commission which was authorized to grant a
franchise to a person for the purpose of racing horses, dogs, or both
horses and dogs.4  "Pari-Mutuel Machines or Appliances" 5 were per-
mitted, provided the qualified voters of Currituck County ratified the
1 239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).
2 State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 577, 80 S. E. 2d 625, 627 (1954).
'N. C. SEss. LAws 1949, c. 541.
' N. C. SEss. LAWS 1949, c. 541, § 2.
* "... a pari-mutuel system is well recognized as a system having no other
purpose that that of providing the facilities . . . for placing bets .... whereby
participants bet on the outcome of the races." State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 582,
80 S. E. 2d 625, 630 (1954).
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Act.6 This Act was ratified, the franchise was given to the Carolina-
Virginia Racing Association, and the track began operations a few miles
from the Virigina line in the town of Moyock. Obviously, if the Act
was constitutional and valid, no crime had been committed, and the
lower court was correct in granting the motion to quash regardless of
the fact that gambling has been held to be a crime.7
In reversing the lower court, the supreme court declared the Act
unconstitutional as violative of Article I, Sections 7 and 31 of the North
Carolina Constitution. Section 31 reads: "Perpetuities and monopolies
are contrary to the genius of a free state and ought not to be allowed."
It is interesting to note, in passing, that failure to provide for suc-
cessors to office in Freeman v. Board of Commissioners,0 was held not
a violation of Section 31, since the General Assembly was presumed to
have power to terminate, change, or continue the appointment. In the
principal case however, the mode of succession, even though clearly
stipulated, was held incompatible with the constitutional section.' 0
The court placed more emphasis on the violation of Section 7, which
provides: "No person or set of persons are entitled to exclusive or sepa-
rate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration
of public services."" Relying on the axiom that "the fundamental prin-
ciple of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it,' 2 counsel for
the Carolina-Virginia Racing Association, as amici curiae, sought to
persuade the court that this section of the constitution was never intended
to apply to situations of this type. 3  An examination of the historical
origin of this section to ascertain just what type of abuses were contem-
plated would seem to be appropriate.
Such a project is as difficult as it is interesting, since both the North
Carolina Constitution and its bill of rights "were read paragraph by
paragraph and discussed (in the convention of 1776) but no record was
made of the discussion."' 4 We are told, however, that "Article three
IN. C. Sass. LAWS 1949, c. 541, § 6.
State v. Brown, 221 N. C. 301, 20 S. E. 2d 286 (1942) ; N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-292 (1952).
8 N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 31. This section was held to have been violated be-
cause: (1) the method of filling vacancies in the Racing Commission made possible
a self-perpetuating membership on the Commission; (2) there was ample provision
for voting the Act in, but no provision for voting it out; (3) the franchise was
irrevocable except for failure to comply with rules not spelled out in the statute.
State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 586, 80 S. E. 2d 625, 633 (1954).
"217 N. C. 209, 7 S. E. 2d 354 (1940)." See note 8 supra.
'IN. C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 7.
2 Perry v. Stancil, 237 N. C. 442, 444, 75 S. E. 2d 512, 514 (1953)." Brief for Carolina-Virginia Racing Association as A4micus Curiae; State v.
Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).




of the North Carolina Declaration (now Art. I, Section 7, quoted suipra)
was copied verbatim from the 4th Article of the Virginia Declaration,
with the ommission of the clause in the Virginia statement which de-
nounced hereditary officers," 15 an omission which would seem to be
highly significant later in this discussion. Apparently, the "men were too
busy to hesitate to copy verbatim what served their ends.""' It is gen-
erally conceded that the Virginia Declaration of Rights was conceived
and written by George Mason either in Raleigh Tavern, Williamsburg,
without the aid of any reference materials, or in his own library utilizing
Magna Charta, the English Petition of Rights, and various philosophical
works.'1 Counsel, as amici curiae, contended in the principal case that
Mason had in mind, "the abuse of absenteeism, the receipt of fees without
the performance of services by public officers, hereditary office holding
and the like," including "the establishing of a hereditary nobility or
aristocracy possessing special privileges such as existed in England."'
Thus such a grant of a franchise to operate pari-mutuel betting machines
would not be within the purview of the section. Various biographers
seem to substantiate this position. Brant says, "Mason's original draft
covers the following topics:
"4. no hereditary offices .... 19
Rowland contends: "The fourth article declares public service to be the
title to public office and since the former is not descendible, neither should
the latter be hereditary."
20
But Hill summarizes the section so that it has a two-fold meaning:
"Except in recognition of public service none shall have a privileged
position in or emoluments from, the community, and no honors are to
be hereditary." 2' Furthermore, if Mason intended to guard against only
the specific evils of hereditary offices, titles of nobility, and public office
malpractices, his composition of that idea into words certainly misled
his colleague, Henry Lee, who observed upon reading the section: "If
a deluge of despotism should sweep over the world and destroy those
" Ketcham, The Sources of the North Carolina Constitution of 1776, 31 NORTE[
CAROLINA HISTORICAL REvIEW 220 (1929). Section 4 of the Virginia Declaration
of Rights reads: "That no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public
services; Which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate,
legislator, or judge to be hereditary." II POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTIu-
TIONS 1909 (1878).: SIKEs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 69-70.
I ROWLAND, LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE, AND SPEECHES OF GEORGE MASON, c. 7
(1892).
" Brief for Carolina-Virginia Racing Association as Anicus Curiae, p. 18;
State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).
10 I BRANT, JAMES MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REVOLUTIONIST, n. 3, p. 427 (1941).
20 ROWLAND, op. cit. supra note 17, at 245.
21 HILL, GEORGE MASON 141 (1938).
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institutions under which freedom is yet protected ... could this single
sentence of Mason's be preserved it should be sufficient to rekindle the
flame of liberty and revive the race of freemen." 22 Such a high tribute
would hardly be paid to a section directed at prohibiting specific abuses
only. That the section is more of a general statement of the fundamental
inalienable rights of man-equal rights to all, special privileges to none-
is particularly clear when the equivalent section of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, likewise modeled upon the Virginia Declaration,2 is ob-
served to read: "Government is ... instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people, nation or community; and not for
the particular emolument or advantage of a single man, family or set of
men, who are part only of that community. '24  Regardless of exactly
what Mason had in mind when he separated his section into two parts
by means of a semicolon, 25 the section must have conveyed a two-fold
meaning to its adopters: (1) no special privileges except in consideration
of public service, and (2) no hereditary offices.
It is then significant to notice that in copying the Virginia Declara-
tion, North Carolina chose to separate Mason's Section 4 into two sec-
tions: Section 7 quoted supra, which is violated in the principal case;
and Section 30 pertaining to hereditary emoluments, which is not in-
volved or invoked in this case. The only information bearing on the
intention of the North Carolina framers of this section which has been
observed reveals that "Section 7 is in harmony with the 3rd Article of
the Mecklenburg Instructions which advised the representatives to 'op-
pose everything that leans to aristocracy or power in the hands of rich
and chief men exercised to the oppression of the poor.' ",20
If there ever was any doubt concerning the construction and applica-
bility of this section, such uncertainty is not apparent in Bank of New
Bern v. Taylor 2 7 decided some thirty-seven years after the adoption of
the State Constitution. In that case the contention was that the legis-
lative act giving a bank a summary mode of collecting debts, i.e., a spe-
cial privilege, was violative of this section. In disposing of the argument,
the court said that such an "objection will vanish when we reflect that
this privilege is not a gift but the consideration for it is public good to
be derived to the citizens at large from the establishment of the bank."28
12 RowLAND, op. cit. supra note 17, as quoted from LEES, REmiARKS ON JEFFER-
soN 127 (1839).
" "The Massachusetts Bill of Rights and all succeeding instruments of the kind
adopted by the different colonies were modeled upon the Virginia Charter and its
principles were engrafted in the amendments of the Federal Constitution." Row-
LAND, op. cit. srupra note 17, at 250.
" II PooRE, FEDERAL. AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1541 (1878).
2" See note 15 supra.
6 KETCHAM, op. cit. supra note 15, as quoted from the Mecklenburg Instruc-
tions as found in 10 NORTH CAROLINA COLONIAL REcoRDs 870a-870f (1890).21 6 N. C. 266 (1813). 28 Id. at 267.
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Although Section 7 was applicable, the particular legislation came within
the exception clause, "in consideration of public service."
Subsequently, the court has relied on Section 7 to declare unconsti-
tutional the following: charter provision exempting one tobacco ware-
house corporation from liability for negligence when other warehotises
did not enjoy such a privilege ;29 charter provision allowing a bank to
charge excessive rates ;30 statute authorizing the depositors of certain
defunct banks to sell their claims to debtors of the same bank ;31 statute
imposing a license tax on some dry cleaners and allowing other dry
cleaners to operate without this additional charge ;32 statute increasing
the liability of sureties on contractor's bonds in Buncombe County only ;3
statute lessening the punishment for violating the prohibition laws in
only five of the 100 counties ;34 and others.3 5
The court has refused to apply Section 7 to declare unconstitutional
a grant of power of eminent domain to public service corporations be-
cause such is deemed within the exception, "but in consideration of
public service" ;36 a pension plan for school teachers because of the ex-
ception ;37 workman's compensation benefits for deputy sheriffs because
of the exception ;38 and legislation to aid the veterans. 39
The cases cited and others seem to indicate that special privileges
will not be given to an individual corporation or person except "in con-
sideration of public service." Such construction would not seem to be
incompatible with the intention of the framers of that Section. The
Currituck Act, which grants a single organization the privilege of violat-
ing a general law against gambling4 0 while denying this privilege to
others, legalizes gambling only on the premises of the franchise holder,
and permits only the franchise holder and its patrons to violate the
general law, is clearly granting a special privilege to a person41 and is,
therefore, unconstitutional.
M otley & Co. v. Southern Finishing and Warehouse Co., 122 N. C. 347, 30
S. E. 3 (1898) ; Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 528 (1949).
" Simonton v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 498 (1874).
" Edgerton v. Hood, 205 N. C. 816, 172 S. E. 481 (1934).
"= State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. 2d 854 (1940).
" Plott Co. v. Ferguson Co., 202 N. C. 446, 163 S. E. 688 (1932).
" State v. Fowler, 193 N. C. 290, 136 S. E. 709 (1927).
'uE. g., Duncan v. City of Charlotte, 234 N. C. 86, 66 S. E. 2d 22 (1951) ; State
v. Glidden Co., 228 N. C. 664, 46 S. E. 2d 860 (1948) ; and see NORTH CAROLINA
MANUAL 1929 (Newsom ed.); and CONNOR AND CHEsHIRE, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ANNOTATED (1911).
" Carolina-Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee River Power Co., 175 N. C. 668,
96 S. E. 99 (1918).
'7 Bridges v. City of Charlotte, 221 N. C. 472, 20 S. E. 2d 825 (1942).
' 8 Towe v. Yancey County, 224 N. C. 579, 31 S. E. 2d 754 (1944).
"Brumley v. Baxter, 225 N. C. 691, 36 S. E. 2d 281 (1945).
,N. C. GEN STAT. § 14-292 (1952) : "If any person play at any game of chance
at which any money, property or other thing is bet, whether the same be in stake
or not, both those who play and those who bet thereon shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor."
" State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 80 S. E. 2d 625 (1954).
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On the other hand, counties as political subdivisions have been the
recipients of privileges not enjoyed by other counties. 42  Apparently,
"no person or set of persons" refers to persons who are under the same
circumstances or conditions and does not refer to areas as such. 48 In
Salsburg v. Maryland, Justice Burton said: "The equal protection clause
relates to equality between persons as such rather than between areas." 44
That case would seem to be an acceptable summation of the law on
equal protection sections of the state constitutions as well as that of the
Federal Constitution. If the phrase, "no person or set of persons" is
construed to include counties, then such familiar acts as those creating
Alcoholic Beverage Control are also unconstitutional. These acts have
not been declared so, although the attempt was made by a group of
prominent citizens45 when the ABC Acts were first enacted by the
General Assembly.46  It is true that in that case the court refused to
rule on the constitutionality of the ABC Acts, saying that the question
was not properly before the court,47 but Alcoholic Beverage Control is
still available on the county option plan in spite of the general prohibi-
tion law. Obviously, these Acts confer special privileges, but these
privileges are directed to the county while the gambling Acts ultimately
channel special benefits to individual persons or corporations, 48 and
therein lies the important distinction. The court in the principal case
anticipated the problem that would be created if a county itself or a
private individual or corporation serving as an agency of the county
operated racing enterprises, but the court found other ways to decide the
issue without answering this more important question. 49
In view of the fact that counties as political subdivisions of the state
do not seem to be within the purview of Section 7, and considering the
vast number of local legislative acts, including those creating Alcoholic
Beverage Control, which are passed each session by the General Assem-
bly, it would seem that a careful draft of legislation permitting counties
"'E.g., N. C. SEss. LAws 1953, c. 135, An Act to Establish a Law Library for
the Public Officials and Courts in New Hanover County; c. 715, An Act Authoriz-
ing Wilson County to Establish a Law Library; c. 1158, An Act to Establish a
County Court Library in Cumberland County.
"' N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 7; State v. Fowler, 193 N. C. 290, 135 S. E. 709 (1927),
in which the court said: "This provision, we think, is a guaranty that every valid
enactment of a general law applicable to the whole state shall operate uniformly
upon persons and property, giving to all under like circumstances equal protection
and security and neither laying burdens nor conferring privileges upon any person
that are not laid or conferred upon others under the same circumstances or condi-
tions."
"Salsburg v. State of Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954).
"Newman v. Commissioners of Vance, 208 N. C. 675, 182 S. E. 453 (1935).
' N. C. PuB. LAws 1935, cc. 418, 493.
Newman.v..Commissioners of Vance, 208 N. C. 675, 182 S. E. 453 (1935).
".State v. Feltbn, 239 N. C. 575, 588, 8Q S. E. 2d 625, 635 (1954) ; N. C. Pun.-
Loc. LAws 1939, c. 540; N. C. Sass. LAws 1949, c. 541.
" State v. Felton, 239 N. C. 575, 587, 80 S. E. 2d 625, 634 (1954).
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to own and operate racing establishments wherein pari-mutuel betting
is permitted could not be declared unconstitutional as violative of Sec-
tion 7, Section 31, or any other section of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion. If this contention is accepted, then the responsibility for permitting
dog and horse racing with its counterpart, pari-mutuel betting, to infil-
trate the North Carolina scene rests solely upon the General Assembly.50
ROBERT D. LEWIS.
Credit Transactions-Conditional Sale Contracts-Default-Remedies
of Buyer and Seller-Liability of Buyer on Check or Note
Given as Down Payment or Installment Payment
In 1893 the North Carolina Supreme Court remarked that condi-
tional sale contracts "are becoming greater in frequency and general
interest. They are principally used in connection with the sale of sewing-
machines, pianos, furniture, soda-fountains, rolling stock on railroads,
and the like."' Today the frequency of such contracts is still increasing,
and the list of products sold under them must be enlarged to include a
variety of recently developed chattels, such as automobiles, television
sets, home appliances, adding machines, and factory equipment.
A typical form of conditional sale contract involves the credit sale
of personal property, where the buyer usually makes a down payment
and undertakes, often by a promissory note, to pay the balance of the
price in installments. Under the contract the buyer receives immediate
possession of the property, and the seller retains title as security together
with the accompanying right to repossession and resale in case of default,2
but the buyer has the power to gain complete title by making full pay-
ment. It is explained that the seller's retention of title distinguishes this
contract from a purchase money chattel mortgage where complete title
is vested in the buyer who immediately reconveys security title to the
seller.3
" For an excellent r~sum6 of racetrack operations in North Carolina, see Ra-
leigh News and Observer, February 14 through 18, 1951, a feature story in five
chapters by Jim Chaney.
1 Puffer & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 378, 383, 17 S. E. 174, 175 (1893).
The instrument that caused this comment was entitled a "lease," requiring periodic
"rentals" until title to a "soda water machine" was conveyed upon full payment,
but the court held it was a conditional sale contract.
2 Earlier notes have stated that in North Carolina the secured party under a
conditional sale contract has the right to repossession before default, unless the
parties manifest a contrary intention by agreement or conduct, and all the writers
suggest that this is undesirable. Notes, 21 N. C. L. REv. 387 (1943) ; 12 N. C. L.
REv. 254 (1934) ; 11 N. C. L. REv. 321 (1933).
'Frick & Co. v. Hilliard, 94 N. C. 117, 119 (1886); Gaul v. Goldburg Furniture
& Carpet Co., 85 Misc. 426, - , 147 N. Y. Supp. 516, 518 (Sup. Ct 1914);
Bogert, The Evolution of the Conditional Sales Law in New York, 8 CORNELL L. Q.
303, 304 (1923). --
However, the North Carolina court, in construing N. C. LAWS 1883, c. 342.
19541
